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Operation "SPRING" 
by 
G.G. Simonds, Lieut.-General 
G.O.C. 
Canadian Forces in the Netherlands 
31 January 1946 
Lieut-General Guy Granville Simonds wrote this 
account of Operation "SPRING" in response to a 
statement written for the Minister of National Defence 
by the Official Historian C.P. Stacey. The statement 
was based on a detailed study of the battle which 
Stacey completed in late 1945. 
Whilst I agree with the proposed text of the 
statement of the Minister of National Defence, 
I have the following comments to make which 
may help to a better understanding of the 
background of operation "SPRING". 
Of all the operations of the war the "holding 
attack" is that least understood by the layman 
for casualties seem to be out of all proportion 
to apparent gains. It is also, for the same 
reasons, the most trying for a commander and 
his troops. Yet to achieve great and decisive 
results against a skilful enemy, the hostile 
reserves must be drawn in, pinned and worn 
down before the real "coup-de-grace" can be 
delivered. In all military history, to force an 
able commander to expend his reserves there 
has been discovered no alternative to the 
"holding attack." To effect its purpose, such an 
attack must be directed against an objective 
about which the enemy is highly sensitive and 
for the protection of which he is certain to 
react. In the Normandy bridgehead the "CAEN 
Hinge" was just such an objective and it was 
inherent in the operational conditions of mid-
July that any attack directed against it would 
meet violent opposition and consequent heavy 
fighting. 
Condit ions at the time of operat ion 
"TOTALIZE" - the "break through" south of 
CAEN - were very different from those at the 
time of operation "SPIRING". Between the 25 
Jul and 7 Aug the Germans had to shift reserves 
to meet the American break-out at AVRANCHES 
and the advance of 12 British Corps of Second 
Army towards the upper ORNE had forced a 
further reduction of the German strength south 
of CAEN. In my original appreciation and 
outline plan for operation "TOTALIZE", I 
considered a "break through" contingent upon 
these conditions and I stated:-
The plan is submitted on the assumption that the right 
wing of Second Army has secured, or imminently threatens 
to secure, a bridgehead east of the R. ORNE, thus loosening 
the enemy grip on his northern pivot. 
As is now well known, the plan of the C.-in-
C. F.M. (then General) Montgomery, was to 
draw in and pin the enemy on the latter's 
sensitive eastern flank thus creating a situation 
favourable to the break out on the western 
flank. Every formation in the Anglo-Canadian 
Armies had to bear its share in the series of 
holding attacks on the eastern end of the 
bridgehead. The task was to draw the German 
armoured strength east of the ORNE and to 
hold it there until the American attack at 
AVRANCHES gained momentum. This was 
successfully achieved and the troops who bore 
the brunt of the heavy, unspectacular fighting 
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south of CAEN deserve just as much credit for 
the final result as do those who made the 
obvious gains at the other extremity of the 
front. General Eisenhower gave this as his own 
view in a public statement, which I know to be 
sincere. 
The Objective 
The ultimate objective for operation "SPRING" 
was the high ground north of CINTHEAUX - the 
key to the German main defence system south 
of CAEN and a necessary stepping stone to our 
advance down the CAEN - FALAISE road. Based 
upon the enemy strength as known prior to the 
attack, the attainment of the objective was 
feasible and the a t tack might open an 
opportunity for deeper exploitation. 
There were two alternative approaches for 
the attack - astride the CAEN - FALAISE road 
or on the axis SOLIERS - BOURGUEBUS. In 
the latter case the left flank was very exposed 
and the left wing of the assault would have to 
move over ground offering no cover. More 
important still, a partial success on this line of 
attack would not improve our tactical position. 
An attack astride the CAEN - FALAISE road 
had its right flank exposed to fire from enemy-
positions on the west bank of the ORNE, but 
the built up area ST ANDRE-SUR-ORNE -
MAY-SUR-ORNE offered a good deal of cover 
and even a partial success astride this axis 
would give us the very important VERRIERES 
ridge. I therefore decided to attack astride the 
CAEN - FALAISE road. It was later, in operation 
"TOTALIZE", that the break-through was made 
along this same axis. 
Timing 
In operation "ATLANTIC", carried out in 
conjunction with 8 British Corps operation 
"GOODWOOD", 2 Canadian Corps had gained 
the initial bridgehead east of the ORNE opposite 
CAEN. At the end of this operation we held the 
northern reverse slopes of the VERRIERES 
ridge. From the crest of the ridge the Germans 
overlooked nearly the whole of the bridgehead 
on the east bank of the ORNE. The deployment 
for any major attack had to be done in darkness. 
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With troops which had not much battle 
experience it was, in my opinion, essential to 
give them as much time as it was possible to 
allow, for forming-up. Deployment could not 
start until after dark and it was equally 
important in my mind that the timing of the 
attack should be such that we should be in 
possession of the crest of the VERRIERES 
ridge before daylight. These conditions left 
very little latitude in the choice of "H" hour. 
Support 
The assault was launched under support of 
a very heavy field and medium artillery barrage 
with superimposed concentrations on known 
centres of resistance. 
Assessment of the Operation 
I find analysis of an operation like the attack 
of the Black Watch at MAY-SUR-ORNE a most 
Lieut-General G.G. Simonds 
(NAC PA 183982) 
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distasteful t a sk for it m e a n s criticism of some, 
who, whatever mis takes they made , made them 
in good faith and paid the supreme sacrifice in 
the course of their duty. 
In view of the eleventh h o u r reinforcement of 
the German posi t ions eas t of the ORNE, as 
revealed in the early s tages of the at tack, there 
will be doubt whe the r the original objective 
was a t ta inable . In the forenoon I made the 
decision no t to l a u n c h the two a rmoured 
divisions b u t I ordered 7 Armoured Division 
forward to reinforce the success of 4 Cdn Inf 
Bde a n d to m a k e cer tain t ha t the impor tan t 
gain of the VERRIERES ridge was not lost. The 
cap tu re of the ridge in operation "SPRING" 
establ ished the firm base which later m a d e 
possible the mount ing of operation "TOTALIZE" 
u n d e r m u c h more favourable condit ions. 
I have s ta ted above t h a t in face of enemy 
s t rength as revealed by the a t tack there will be 
doubt as to whe the r the original final objective 
was obtainable . The whole p lan was fully 
d i s c u s s e d wi th a n d approved by Genera l 
Dempsey, G.O.C.-in-C. Second Army (under 
which 2 Canad ian Corps was operating) both 
before a n d after the operation. I considered at 
the t ime (and I have found no evidence since to 
change my view) t h a t the objectives of MAY-
SUR-ORNE, VERRIERES AND TILLY-LA-
CAMPAIGNE could and should have been taken 
and held wi thout heavy casual t ies and t h a t in 
the event, the casual t ies of certain un i t s were 
excessive. Tha t we failed to cap ture and hold 
MAY-SUR-ORNE a n d TILLY-LA-CAMPAIGNE 
a n d t h a t we suffered w h a t were, in my opinion, 
excessive casual t ies was due to a series of 
mis t akes a n d errors of j udgemen t in minor 
tactics. 
I do not express the above view with the 
object of directing criticism on officers, some of 
whom lost thei r lives in th is action or later. I 
would prefer not to m a k e a s t a tement and 
certainly not be quoted in th is connect ion at 
th i s t ime, b u t as a ma t t e r of historical record, 
w h e n th is operat ion can be examined in all its 
aspec ts , I feel u n d e r an obligation to express 
my frank opinion. 
I have in t roduced m a n y divisions into their 
first ba t t les - Canadian , British, American, 
and Polish a n d I am convinced t h a t no a m o u n t 
of t ra ining can compensa te for ac tua l bat t le 
experience. I t seems t h a t no th ing b u t the 
ac tual experience of bat t le will forcibly imprint 
on men ' s minds the great impor tance of certain 
tactical measu re s , no ma t t e r how often they 
have been rei terated in t raining. On many 
occasions in summing up on training exercises, 
and as final reminders on visiting un i t s on 
their arrival in the br idgehead, I personally 
emphasized the great impor tance of:-
(a) The securi ty of the s ta r t Tine before an 
at tack. 
(b) The necessi ty of closely following artillery 
suppor t ing fire. 
(c) The importance of mopping-up which 
required a detailed search of the ground. 
(d) The quick es tab l i shment of a firm base to 
meet the inevitable counter -a t tack . 
Non-observance of some or all of t he above 
tactical m e a s u r e s was in my opinion the cause 
of failure to secure initial objectives a n d of 
unnecessa ry casual t ies in operat ion "SPRING". 
Security of the Start Line 
In mobile operat ions there is no con t inuous 
"front" b u t a firm base is es tabl ished on a 
series of pivotal localities. Between these 
localities both sides are free to patrol - especially 
dur ing da rknes s . The bes t German t roops 
were always very aggressive and good at th is 
patrolling. Therefore, before an a t t ack i t w a s 
essential to patrol the area forward of the s t a r t 
line to ensure t ha t German patrols h a d not 
infiltrated between the forward localities, a n d 
having m a d e certain the a rea was clear, to 
s ta t ion s t rong s t and ing pat ro ls to prevent 
hostile patrols from penet ra t ing a n d interfering 
with the forming-up of assau l t ing t roops. In 
operation "SPRING" though mobile patrols were 
sent out and reported the s t a r t line clear, 
cerat in un i t s did not leave s t and ing pat ro ls on 
the ground to cover deployment. In fact, 
German patrols did pene t ra te a n d th is w a s the 
cause of some confusion dur ing deployment 
and delay on the pa r t of some un i t s in crossing 
their s ta r t line. 
67 
3
Simonds: Operation “SPRING”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1992
The Necessity of Closely Following 
Artillery Supporting Fire 
With good troops in field defences the 
neutralizing effect of the most intense artillery 
supporting fire is only temporary. The better 
the troops the quicker is the recovery following 
the cessation of shelling. It is therefore most 
important that assaulting troops should cross 
the start line on time and press home the 
a s s a u l t on each success ive objective 
immediately covering 
fire lifts. Some latitude 
is allowed by arranging 
for a barrage to dwell 
for a specified number 
of m i n u t e s on the 
"opening line", but if 
this pause is prolonged 
it gives the enemy 
warn ing of the 
direction and frontage 
of attack. From my 
appreciation of events 
at the t ime, I am 
certain in my own 
mind that there was a 
per iod du r ing the 
attack on the morning 
of 25 Jul when MAY-
SUR-ORNE could have 
been en t e red and 
cleared without heavy 
casualties. Owing to 
inexper ience and 
failure to appreciate 
the vital importance of 
time and how fleeting 
are such opportunities, the favourable period 
was allowed to pass unexploited. 
The Importance of Thorough Mopping-Up 
This is perhaps the hardest of all lessons to 
teach other than by experience. Until the 
soldier has actually witnessed it, it is hard to 
realize the complete absence of obvious evidence 
of the presence of the enemy in an area which 
he may actually hold in considerable strength. 
The best German troops were very clever at 
concealment and also knew the value of 
withholding fire so as not to disclose their 
positions too early. When a hostile locality was 
entered under supporting covering fire, it was 
necessary to properly organize at once a detailed 
search of the area to clear out the lurking 
enemy. The various 
reports tha t MAY-
SUR-ORNE was 
cleared by troops who 
had penetrated well 
into the village, 
showed t h a t th i s 
detailed search had 
never been properly 
organized and 
thorough. 
It h a s been a 
source of deep regret 
to me tha t a fine 
ba t ta l ion like the 
Black Watch suffered 
so heavily in this 
attack. I would prefer 
to make no statement 
on the subject for I 
dis l ike even 
suggesting criticism 
of those who lost their 
l ives, b u t if a 
statement is required 
from me as a matter of record, I consider that 
the losses were unnecessarily heavy and the 
results achieved disappointing. Such heavy 
losses were not inherent in the plan nor in its 
intended execution. The action of the Black 
Watch was most gallant but was tactically 
unsound in its detailed execution. 
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